In the last two decades, technological progress and a decrease in trade barriers fostered the formation of global value chains, in which di¤erent sequences of production stages, previously performed in close proximity, can now be unbundled globally. In this contribution we test at the …rm level the optimal allocation of ownership rights along a productive sequence, as in the framework set by Antras and Chor (2013). For this purpose we exploit an own-built dataset made of 4,214 parents which have acquired or established at least one a¢liate in the period 2004-2012. Overall, they control 104,720 a¢liates and operate in 185 countries. Assuming a technological orientation of the value chain from the …nal consumer upwards, we positively test that incentives to integrate suppliers vary systematically with: i) the relative upstream or downstream position of the a¢liate with respect to the parent; ii) the elasticity of demand faced by the parent. Further, we …nd new insights for …rm-level heterogeneity along supply chains, as more productive and bigger parent companies are more likely to choose a¢liates next to the …nal consumer. Once controlling for the complexity of the internal supply chain at the moment the investment decisions occur, we …nd that bigger internal chains show a lower propensity to integrate at the margin, probably discounting increasing coordination costs. Results are robust after di¤erent speci…cations. However, we detect some non-linearities over …rm-level distributions, when integrated a¢liates approach the bottom of the supply chain, next to the …nal consumer, after the VIII decile of the a¢liates' downstreamness. In this case we presume that a horizontal rather than a vertical integration strategy could prevail.
Introduction
Since the late 80s, technological progress and a decrease in trade barriers have fostered the formation of cross-border sequences of productive stages undertaken by …rms along virtually international assembly lines 1 . From the product design to the distribution to consumers, all intermediate stages of production can involve networks of …rms that are dispersed in several countries. Each production stage can be eventually organized by a company in two alternative ways, either keeping the input production within its boundaries, in case of standard vertical integration, or outsourcing it and engaging in arm's length contracts. Thereby, the ordered sequence of all production stages makes a chain with some suppliers that are integrated or not within one or more companies' productive boundaries.
The aim of this contribution is to test for the organization of these Global Value Chains (GVCs) at the …rm-level, as sequences of intermediate stages that are subject to contractual frictions. In this context, the …nal and optimal allocation of ownership rights along the sequence can depend both on the relative position of each intermediate producer, and on the surplus that can be extracted from the sale of the …nal output, on which all the producers along the chain can rely. Here we adopt and test the theoretical framework set by Antràs and Chor (2013) , whose main proposition predicts that if the demand elasticity for the …nal output is su¢ciently elastic, vertical integration occurs for the stages of the supply chain that are more proximate to the …nal consumer. We …nd con…rmation of this main prediction, but we also provide evidence of some non-linearities, once the full range of demand elasticity is exploited and the parent company approaches the bottom of the supply chain. Results are robust to several speci…cations, also controlling for the simultaneity bias that could possibly arise after including in the same sample newly integrated a¢liates and long-established corporate structures.
Moreover, we are able to detect …rm-level heterogeneity in vertical integration strategies along the value chain. We …nd that the more productive and larger parents are able to pick a¢liates located relatively downstream. Also, conditional on past choices of integration, we …nd that more productive parents integrate less likely further stages of production. Similarly, parents already controlling complex supply chains show a lower propensity to integrate further intermediate producers as they have to discount increasing internal coordination costs.
For the purpose of our empirical analysis we exploit an own-built database of domestic and multinational Business Groups (BGs), following the methodology set in Altomonte and Rungi (2013) , for which the observation unit is a parent company that organizes several a¢liates through a form of hierarchical control. Hence, we complement our …rm-level data with metrics of downstreamness and demand elasticity sourced respectively by Antràs and Chor (2013) and Broda and Weinstein (2006) .
For example, consider the case of two BGs present in our dataset: Sony and Johnson & Johnson. We report these two case studies in Tables 1 and 2 . The …rst is a group originated in Japan and primarily focused on electronics manufacturing, whereas the second is a US multinational producing medical devices and pharmaceutical products. From our data both exhibit similar degrees of parent downstreamness, but face very di¤erent average demand elasticities and hence very di¤erent vertical integration propensities. Both BGs have a similar group size, as they control 405 and 353 a¢liates respectively and, when looking at their parent outputs, they are among the most downstream in our sample (:87 and :92) , but …nal consumers tend to be much less price sensitive in the case of Sony (elasticity around 4:79) than in the case of Johnson & Johnson (elasticity around 12:72) . Accordingly, the average a¢liates' downstreamness is :50 for Sony and :71 for Johnson & Johnson. That is, when the demand is su¢ciently elastic, vertical integration preferably occurs downstream, leaving potential outsourcing of inputs further upstream 2 .
Our empirical framework allows the decision making center, i.e. the parent …rm, to locate in any of the production stages, as we collect all …rms' activities along the chain (Ramondo et al., 2015) , 1 See Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2014) and previously Hummels et al. (2001) for a discussion of the relevance of the phenomenon and of the structural economic changes it entails.
2 These correlations are systematic in our data. For example, when we take two smaller groups. Seachange International Inc., primarily active in computer and peripheral equipment manufacturing, controls 11 a¢liates and has a downstream parent (:92) that faces a relatively low demand elasticity (4:77). Ashok Leyland, an Indian automobile manufacturing, controls 10 a¢liates and still has a very downstream parent (:94), but in this case it faces a much higher demand elasticity (84:19) for the …nal output. Consistently with the above results the average a¢liates' downstreamness is relatively lower for the former (:53) than for the latter (:68). controlling also for potential …rm-level heterogeneity from …nancial accounts. Thus, we can make reference to the relative positioning as opposed to the absolute position of each parent company in relationship to vertical integration choices. Indeed, based on preliminary evidence from our sample, we …nd that parent companies can be often located up in the supply chain, in violation of the assumption by the Antràs and Chor (2013) model that places the decision making centers always at the bottom, where consumers buy a …nal product. Nonetheless, we argue that our empirical evidence shows that the main tenet of the theoretical framework is still valid, but until the VII or VIII deciles of the a¢liate positioning, depending on the downstreamness metrics we adopt. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we brie ‡y review previous literature. Section 3 introduces the construction of our sample and the variables used in our econometric investigations. In Section 4 we present di¤erent empirical speci…cations and robustness checks. Finally Section 5 concludes.
Literature review
Several works investigated the determinants of cross-border vertical integration, i.e. the global decision to 'make or buy', as giving rise to intra-…rm transactions. Among others, Antràs (2003) revealed why intra-…rm trade is mainly concentrated in capital intensive industries and between capital abundant countries, while Antràs and Helpman (2004) argued that only the most productive among them are able to sustain higher sunk costs of international vertical integration in a context of heterogeneous …rms, and that would explain the positive correlation existing between intra-…rm trade and productivity dispersions. These theoretical models were generalized by Antràs and Helpman (2008) in order to accommodate for varying degrees of contractual frictions, …nding that better contracting institutions in the suppliers' country of origin let o¤shoring strategies prevail 3 . With a broader perspective, Acemoglu et al. (2007) were the …rst to consider the possibility that unique headquarters have to commit to contracts with several suppliers, in this way extending in scope the one-shot 'make or buy' decision. Eventually, they show that a greater contractual incompleteness leads to the adoption of less advanced technologies, even more when intermediate inputs are highly complementary.
Based on empirical …ndings, we can distinguish two main strands of literature. On one hand, Nunn and Tre ‡er (2008) and Nunn and Tre ‡er (2013) have a primary industry/product focus when examining the determinants of U.S. imports share that occurs intra-…rm. They con…rm a logic of property-rights theories in the case of multinational …rms: vertical integration prevails when non-contractible headquarters inputs are more relevant and productivity is higher. Similarly, Bernard et al. (2010) …nd that intra-…rm trade mainly occurs for skill-intensive products from developing countries but for capital-intensive products from advanced countries.
On the other hand, when exploiting …rm level data, Tomiura (2007) and Kohler and Smolka (2012) document the well-known productivity premia associated with multinational enterprises, this time di¤erentiating by sourcing strategies: foreign outsourcers and exporters tend to be less productive than the …rms active in FDI or involved in multiple globalization modes, but they are more productive than purely domestic …rms. There is also evidence that for the most productive multinationals the chance of trading with an independent supplier is higher when they intensively use relationship-speci…c inputs, as in Defever and Toubal (2013) . In addition, Corcos et al. (2013) support the prediction that intra-…rm imports are more likely in capital-and skill-intensive …rms, in highly productive …rms and from countries with a good rule of law, whereas Acemoglu et al. (2009) register a greater propensity to vertically integrate in hosting countries where one can …nd both higher contracting costs and a more favorable …nancial environment. Also, as shown by Alfaro and Charlton (2009) , a great share of intra-…rm trade occurs already from within the same industry and Alfaro et al. (2013) ascertain that higher market prices lead to a greater propensity to vertically integrate.
However, none of the previous works consider the sequential nature of production as a¤ecting location and organizational decisions by multinational enterprises. First e¤orts in this direction are made by Harms et al. (2012) , who consider a particular sequence of stages and a non-monotonic variations of transportation costs along the chain to show the trade-o¤ faced by …rms between o¤shoring and domestic production. Moreover, Costinot et al. (2013) develop a theoretical model for which asupply chain is ordered following the ideal standardization content of production, with more standardized stages entailing a lower content of knowledge and hence a higher country growth potential. Their aim is to prove how country patterns of specialization can have consequences on income distribution on a world scale.
We instead choose to exploit the framework proposed by Antràs and Chor (2013) , where the authors draw a property-rights model of …rms' boundaries, dissecting the optimal allocation of ownership rights in a context where production processes are sequential and contracts between a …nal producer and its suppliers are all potentially incomplete. Di¤erently from previous works, they introduce a technological ordering in production stages, so that one stage can commence only when intermediate inputs from upstream stages are complete. This is a noteworthy advance in the comprehension of the organization of Global Value Chains, since their model design is capable to proxy an actual productive environment in which a …rm and its suppliers have to bargain sequentially, but on the basis of an expected surplus that is realized only after the sale of the …nal good, at the end of all production stages. In this sequential context the authors introduce the classic trade-o¤ faced by each supplier, who has to undertake a relation-speci…c investment in order to provide a customized input that is partially non-contractible. Hence, contractual incompleteness leads the …nal good producer, who owns residual control rights in case of integration, to enhance its bargaining power in case of a contractual breach. However, as in similar frameworks, the strategy of vertical integration reduces the suppliers' incentives to invest in the productive relationship.
The key novelty is that there exists a dependence among all production stages because the relationspeci…c investment made by upstream suppliers a¤ects also the incentives to invest in more downstream stages. If an investment made by a supplier increases the value of the marginal product, production stages can be labelled sequential complements, and it occurs when the price elasticity of …nal-good demand is higher than the value of the elasticity of substitution across di¤erent inputs. Conversely, if a supplier perceives a diminished product value, we have the case of sequential substitutes, in which the demand elasticity of the …nal good is su¢ciently low. Therefore, inputs are sequential complements (substitutes) only if the elasticity of …nal good demand is higher (lower) than the elasticity of substitution across the intermediates provided by the di¤erent suppliers.
At the time of writing, a preliminary successful attempt to test at the …rm-level this framework is done in Alfaro et al. (2015) , although with more limited information in terms of sample coverage and not controlling for …rm-level heterogeneity, after aggregating a¢liates' information at the industrylevel.
In the following analysis, coherently with our choice of a theoretical reference, we positively test the propensity towards vertical integration along sequential production stages by parents acquiring control over companies, identifying complements and substitutes cases and introducing controls for …rm heterogeneity. Thereafter, we detect some non-linearities at the bottom of the supply chain, once the full distribution of a¢liates' downstreamness and parent elasticity is exploited.
Sample construction
As we are interested in studying the determinants of organization of production stages by a parent company, the sample we build comprises networks of a¢liates whose economic activity is coordinated by a single ultimate owner, that we consider as headquarter. In this we rely on a methodological framework set by Altomonte and Rungi (2013) , according to which the observation unit is a set of a¢liates including its headquarters, whose units can be located either in the country of origin of the parent or abroad, and that are controlled after reaching an absolute majority threshold for direct and indirect equity participation. The bene…t of adopting a network approach resides in the possibility to take into account both direct control, when majority of votes is reached directly at the parent-level, and indirect control, when a¢liates exert control on other sub-a¢liates. The phenomenon of crossparticipations is often neglected in other empirical works 4 . Here we follow international standards (OECD, 2005; EUROSTAT, 2007; UNCTAD, 2009 ) to set a control threshold at absolute majority of stakes ( 50:01%). Hence, for our purpose, we elaborate data from two original sources: we retrieve M&A deals occurred in the period 2004 to 2012 from the Zephyr Database and we complement this information with data on networks of a¢liates existing in 2012, as sourced from the Ownership Database contained in Orbis 5 , from where we collect also …rm-level …nancial accounts, when available, and incorporation dates.
After combining information from acquisitions and takeovers, on the basis of incorporation and acquisition dates, we are able to separate between a stock and a ‡ow of a¢liates that can help us in determining the choice of integrating production stages also as a function of the already established internal supply chains, possibly developed over a very long span of time.
As we report in Table 3 , we end up with a main sample made of 4,214 manufacturing parents controlling a total of 104,720 a¢liates in 185 countries. Of these, 71,011 a¢liates are incumbent, whereas 33,709 are new a¢liates in a productive network after 2004 and until 2012.
Since the main target of our analysis is the organization of production sequences before reaching a …nal consumer, we exclude from our analysis parent companies that are mainly active in primary or services industries, i.e. their …nal output is not a manufactured product 6 . Still, vertically integrated supply chains in our …nal sample can rely on service inputs, provided by a¢liates throughout the entire production network.
The rich structure of our data allows controlling for a possible endogenous formation of internal value chains, with parents integrating activities but conditional on already established productive networks. For this purpose we will introduce a control function approach, taking advantage of the information about a¢liates that were integrated before 2004, as reported in the third column of 4 A¢liates can participate with their own portfolio of stakes in determining the total allocation of property rights on top of the parent company. Eventually, the object of analysis becomes a Business Group, made of at least two formally autonomous legal entities that are coordinated by a unique parent, which can develop very complex organizational structures. For more details on the procedure and its bene…ts, see Altomonte and Rungi (2013) .
5 Both sources we use are compiled by Bureau van Dijk, a consultancy …rm collecting companies' information for business intelligence. All in all, Zephyr contains information on over one million deals while Orbis includes up-to-date information for over 120 million …rms worldwide. 6 We detect about 223,167 parents that are mainly involved in primary or services industries, which can have invested or not in the period of our analyses (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) . Preliminary analysis shows that a relative majority of them includes small …nance and consulting …rms, construction and transportation companies. Table 3 . Indeed, many groups of …rms present in our data can report even century-old traditions of productive activity, going farther back any measured variable we can include as a control in our empirical speci…cations. In Table 4 we provide a geographic coverage of our main sample by some countries/areas where we validate the existence of a high ‡ows' concentration between capital-abundant countries, a crucial feature detected also in several works when looking at related-parties trade data. Parents are classi…ed by their home country in the second column, while in the third column we report the total number of a¢liates owned by those parents, either as a stock before 2004 or as investment operations undertaken after 2004, respectively reported in column 4 and in column 5 of Table 4 .
As expected, the majority of our internal supply chains originate in OECD countries (80%), whose a¢liates represent around 85% (88,041 out of 104,720) of our …nal sample. Of these, 27,174 are new acquisitions. In addition, EU countries report the largest number of parents (34%) and a¢liates (55%), with two thirds of them already integrated in the past, while in US we …nd about 1,400 parents (32%) which control 18,005 a¢liates 7 .
7 To validate our dataset we can mainly rely on Altomonte and Rungi (2013), from which we borrow the data method-From our sample, a representative parent controls on average 24:87 a¢liates, it is active in 6 countries and started its activity on average in 1983. However, distributions are rather skewed since the median parent controls only 5 a¢liates present in 2 countries. About 63% of our sample is made of multinational groups, i.e. networks coordinated by a parent that report at least one foreign a¢liate. Yet, we keep also entirely domestic groups, for which all a¢liates are located in the parents' country of origin, as a further control group, assuming that parents can choose to develop supply chains entirely at home.
For the purpose of our analysis we link …rms' activity information with industry-level metrics of demand elasticity and downstreamness. The …rst we source from Broda and Weinstein (2006) , assuming that for su¢ciently high (low) values of this average demand elasticity the corresponding elasticity of substitution across inputs is low (high) 8 .
As for downstreamness metrics, we source directly from Antràs and Chor (2013) , according to which the relative location of an industry in production processes is measured as the distance from …nal consumers, thus giving an orientation to technological processes over di¤erent stages of production, eventually leading to production of …nal goods. Hence, downstreamness metrics are normalized on a range in [0; 1], where 1 represents full proximity to …nal demand and 0 is the beginning of a production line.
In absence of original information on actual shipments of intermediate inputs, these metrics turn to 2002 US Input-Output tables produced by US Census Bureau in order to obtain average measures of the relative position of each industry in the production processes 9 . We exploit both alternative metrics of downstreamness: the …rst is built as the ratio of the aggregate direct use of an input to the aggregate total use of that industry (DuseTuse), whereas the second weighs for the average position of that industry in the supply chain at which an industrial output is used (DownMeasure).
After merging with our …rm-level sample, in Table 5 we report the ten highest and lowest values of DuseTuse and DownMeasure across the 473 manufacturing industries we observe at the 6-digit of the NAICS rev.2007. The industries featuring the lowest downstreamness values tend to be in raw materials processing (aluminium, petrochemical, or copper), whereas industries with highest values are footwear and automobile manufacturing. In Table 5 , the two alternative measures share …ve out of ten bottom industries and six out of top ten industries in our …rm-level sample.
Thus, for each parent and a¢liate along the control chain we have industry a¢liations at the 6-digit NAICS rev.2007 classi…cation, including both primary and secondary activities. After matching downstreamness industry metrics with the 6-digit NAICS rev.2007 …rms' activities, we average over parents' and a¢liates' primary activities to obtain their positioning along the supply chain. Indeed, given the conglomerate nature of some groups of …rms included in our sample, we may want exploit information on the full set of activities performed by a company, which can be active in more than one business or can be multiproduct in nature. Nevertheless, 90% of parent …rms and 70% of a¢l-iates in our sample present a single primary activity. In Table 6 and in Figure 1 and 2 we report descriptive statistics and visualizations of downstreamness distributions from our …rm-level sample. The correction made originally from input-output tables on the DownMeasure, for the length of the supply chain, is particularly evident when comparing distributions of either a¢liates or parents with the values of DuseTuse metrics. The …rst has a di¤erent support, at least from our …rm-level sample, as it starts at a higher value of :21. Also, both parents and a¢liates show a thicker left tail in the DownMeasure distribution. As we will see in the following empirical analyses, this di¤erence will not re ‡ect a substantial change in results for relative positioning of a parent with respect to its integrated a¢liates.
In fact, we can already notice an important descriptive …nding. In contradiction with the original ology applied to the same data sources. There, the authors exploit a full dataset of all 270,474 active headquarters controlling more than 1,500,000 (domestic and foreign) a¢liates worldwide in 2010. They check for value-added generation, then they validate the full sample after matching against the corresponding …gures provided by (UNCTAD, 2011) . Correlations by country for parents and a¢liates are respectively :94 and :93. 8 As in the industry-level investigation by Antràs and Chor (2013) , we assume that any existing cross-sectoral variation in input substitutability is largely uncorrelated with the elasticity of demand faced by the parent. 9 The use of the US input-output table for the whole set of countries is justi…ed by the assumption of a correlation in inputs patterns across countries, assuming a common technology frontier, a Leontief production function and crosscountry factor price equalization (Acemoglu et al., 2009 assumption by Antràs and Chor (2013) model, in general a parent company does not perform as a …nal-good producer. As we detect in Table 6 , an average parent has a downstreamness around :6. That is, a parent's initial and absolute positioning on a supply chain can be high and far from the …nal consumer before starting any sourcing decisions. Indeed, if we take as reference the unweighted downstreamness (DuseTuse), it does range from a minimum of :07 to a maximum of :99 (from :23 to :99 for the alternative Down metrics). Thus, we can argue that what really matters is the relative (not absolute) positioning of the parent with respect to integrated stages of production, once taking as exogenous the orientation of technological stages towards demand. On the other hand, parents tend to own a¢liates that can operate both in industries that are downstream or upstream with respect to the parent …rm's industry. Among others, this result is consistent with what Ramondo et al. (2015) …nd, for the huge span of activities possibly integrated by multinational corporations. In any case, a generalization of the Antràs and Chor (2013) setup seems to be valid, since on average, the sample of a¢liates show in Table 6 a slightly smaller downtreamness than sample parents in all moments of sample distributions. In the following analyses we will see how our empirical strategies do con…rm these preliminary weak …ndings, paving the way for a systematic analysis in terms of relative distances between parents and a¢liates downstreamness and demand elasticity.
In Table 6 we further include descriptives of the demand elasticity after merging with …rm-level information, borrowing from Broda and Weinstein (2006) 10 . Here we elaborate on demand elasticity to reproduce the notions of sequential substitutes and sequential complements already proposed by Antràs and Chor (2013) in an industry-level analysis. Accordingly, we split the sample in two subsets by the median elasticity value (i.e. 5:37) for all 437 manufacturing sectors present in our data. Hence, 1 0 The use of the US import demand elasticities for the whole set of countries is justi…ed by the assumption, made also in other works, of broadly similar consumers' preferences across countries. Further, we apply the same matching procedure to …rms' activities as for the downstreamness metrics.
we classify the above-median industries as complements and the below-median as substitutes cases. Finally, in Table 7 we report summary statistics for a set of measures that in literature have been identi…ed as systematic determinants of the propensity to transact within …rm boundaries. First, we add parent level variables: labor productivity allows controlling for the regularity according to which the most productive …rms have the highest probability to invest abroad, as suggested by Antràs and Helpman (2004) and Helpman et al. (2004) , and so tend to integrate a larger interval of production stages. Capital intensity of the parent is usually positively associated with intra-…rm trade (Antràs, 2003) . Firm size, age and number of already established a¢liates allow to control whether the largest parents and the oldest parents are more prone to face the the sunk costs of a vertical integration (Blomström and Lipsey, 1991) , also in the case they hold already a multinational status (Greenaway and Kneller, 2007) . We further include the degree of contractibility for a¢liates' activities (i.e. the sellers' industries), as based on the underlying share of products from an industry that are transacted on organized exchanges or are reference-priced according to Rauch (1999) classi…cation, hence potentially calling for an easier deal to be reached when performed within a …rm's boundary (Nunn and Tre ‡er, 2008) . Two other country level variables sourced from the World Bank are instead associated to a¢liates' location: Rule of Law re ‡ects perceptions on the extent to which agents have con…dence in and abide by the rules of the economy, and Entry Cost represents cost to start a business, as a percentage of income per capita. In Data Appendix we provide further details for sources and usage of these variables. 4 Empirical strategies
Baseline
Our aim is to explain the position of an integrated a¢liate along a value chain as a function of a parent's downstreamness and its output demand elasticity. We start by testing the following baseline equation augmented with …rm, industry and country level information:
where X i(j)c is the ith a¢liate downstreamness, alternatively measured as DuseTuse or DownMeasure as from Antràs and Chor (2013) , integrated by the jth parent and operaing in country c. Among independent variables, X j stands for jth parent downstreamness and j is a latent variable for parent demand elasticity, that we interact ( j X j ) with the jth parent position along the supply chain. Brie ‡y, with this baseline equation we start following the procedure set by Antràs and Chor (2013) , when making use of the original demand elasticity sourced by Broda and Weinstein (2006) , in order to split the sample into industries that can be considered sequential complements (with elasticity above the median, j > med ) and industries that can be considered sequential substitutes (with demand elasticity below the median, j < med ) over the value chain. As a result, our indicator j is a dummy taking the value 1 in the complements cases and 0 for substitutes. Accordingly, we expect 3 > 0, as parents would show a greater propensity to integrate suppliers that enter further downstream when the …nal demand is su¢ciently elastic. Z i(j) collects …rm level control measures in logarithmic scale, namely parent labor productivity, capital intensity, size, total number of controlled a¢liates, together with a dummy variable for multinational status and …nally an a¢liate's degree of contractibility based on its industrial activity. In W c we collect two host country c's control measures, namely Rule of Law and Entry Cost, sourced by the World Bank 11 . Nested results for the baseline speci…cation are reported in Table 8 , where we …nd a con…rmation of the theoretical prediction we were looking for: the higher the demand elasticity faced by a parent the more downstream are its integrated suppliers when its relative positioning is taken into account. In all speci…cations we indeed show that the e¤ect of parent downstreamness is positive and signi…cant at the 1% level in case of sequential complements. The …nding is robust to inclusion of both alternative metrics for downstreamness. Further, we …nd that parents tend to control production stages proximate to their main activity. Each parent and its suppliers tend to be relatively close along a value chain, as the higher the parent downstreamness the higher also the a¢liates' downstreamness. This novel result is con…rmed also when we include …rm-level controls and host country …xed e¤ects. We argue that what we …nd here can be discussed also in connection with Atalay et al. (2014) , who report that after the acquisition an a¢liate and a parent are very similar along multiple dimensions. In the US case, they …nd that vertical ownership does not seem to increase ex post the level of actual shipments among productive establishments. Hence, the authors suggest that an omitted variable bias could be responsible for their counterintuitive …nding, as it is not possible to control for unobserved exchanges of intangible inputs, which can instead be the rationale for new vertical acquisitions.
We rather argue that the …nding of Atalay et al. (2014) could su¤er from another di¤erent omitted variable bias that the authors do not consider, namely the a¢liate's relative positioning along the chain that can be the same before and after the acquisition. Indeed, if the sequential setup of the Antràs and Chor (2013) model is true, and we believe in our previous …nding, both an a¢liate and its proximate parent would show similar levels of downstreamness, before and after the acquisition, as the overall propensity to exchange physical intermediate inputs would be already given by the ex ante peculiarity of the production stage they perform.
Interestingly, productivity and size are positively related to our dependent variable, which reveals that the more productive and larger parents pick more likely a¢liates located next to the …nal consumer, while older parents seem more prone to integrate upstream stages of production. We will see however in Section 4.2 that the correlation with parent age is not resilient to controls for simultaneity bias, when mixing up together old established a¢liates and newly integrated ones. Similarly, also the negative correlation between a¢liate downstreamness and total number of integrated a¢liates will vanishes when we will perfom an endogenous treatment model.
Since sample construction we kept on purpose both domestic and multinational groups of …rms, as we rationally assume a company can also choose to develop a supply chain entirely at home. Hence, a dummy variable for the multinational status controls whether a di¤erent vertical strategy occurs when crossing national borders at least once. Here we …nd that groups having at least one activity abroad are more likely to integrate upstream production stages. In addition, we check for di¤erent combinations of factors of production that eventually relates to value chain positioning, by adding a measure of headquarters' capital-intensity. Our central result does not change, but we …nd that a higher capital intensity is associated with stages of production farther up from …nal consumers.
Nonetheless, the company's choice of organizational mode can be a¤ected by external institutional environments, especially when its boundaries extend across di¤erent countries and/or industries. To test if our results are robust over geographic and industrial extensions, we included both country proxies of contractual environment and implicit contractual frictions for a¢liates' industries. Not surprisingly, we …nd that higher levels of inputs' contractibility are negatively correlated with a¢li-ates' downstreamness. As from the original calculation of the contractibility proxy by Rauch (1999) , upstream stages are more likely to be reference-priced and/or traded on an organized exchange, thus they are more easily contractible 12 . This is consistent with an increased propensity by the parent to integrate upstream stages if parties could specify better their respective rights and duties (Antràs and Helpman, 2008) . Less intuitive seems the negative correlation between a¢liates' downstreamness and host countries' entry cost.
Lastly, we …nd that the overall quality of institutions, here proxied by the country rule of law, is not signi…cantly related to a¢liates' positioning along the chain.
All our results are robust in signi…cance and signs when we introduce the alternative metric for downstreamness (Down), which takes into account the 'length' of the chain after adopting a weighing system by production stages, in columns 4, 5 and 6 of Table 8 .
Further, main results are also robust to sample composition e¤ects. In Table 9 we test our full speci…cation …rst after excluding purely horizontal strategies, for a¢liates positioned at the same level of the parent (i.e. a¢liates reporting the same level of downstreamness), then restricting our sample to manufacturing inputs in order to avoid measurement problems in services industries. Additionally, in columns 5 and 6 of Table 9 , we proceed testing if our results are also robust when we take into account only the a¢liates that are located more upstream than the parent, whereas in the last two columns we exclusively control for newly established a¢liates. In all these cases we …nd con…rmation of our main prediction, according to which parents tend to integrate more downstream a¢liates once facing sequential complement case. Only in the case of excluding stages that are more downstream than the parent, we register shaky results for correlations with parent size and multinational status. The latter should not come as a surprise, as we are deliberately excluding from our sample an important part of the a¢liates' actual distribution over the supply chain. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Endogenous integration
We now turn to investigate the possible endogenous formation of value chains, when including in the same sample investment decisions undertaken over a long span of time, but controlling only for parent features measured with reference to the last decade, for when we have available information. We argue that this empirical problem can be worked out with a binary control function approach 13 , eventually exploring how new integration choices can be a¤ected by parent features and already established vertical chains.
For this purpose, we are able to separate from our sample the investment choices made in the period 2004 to 2012, for which we have contemporary observations of parent companies' characteristics, from the a¢liates already controlled by the same parent companies but before the investment decision, which we take as a control group.
We make use of a control treatment function at a …rst step represented by a probit equation as follows:
where d i(j) is a binary variable equal to 1 if the ith a¢liate is integrated after 2004 by the jth parent and 0 otherwise. Z j represents parent-level control measures, namely number of already established a¢liates, labor productivity, capital intensity, size and age, all in logarithmic scale. Thereby, the outcome equation borrows from our baseline in eq. 1, as follows:
to which we add the same binary variable d i(j) as in 2, this time as a further regressor. Its coe¢-cients will eventually return us the average treatment e¤ect (ATE) on a¢liate positioning over the supply chain. Our speci…cation allows netting out in the outcome equation the simultaneous e¤ect of endogenous parents' characteristics, as they can already be the result of past integration choices. Errors are clustered by parent companies and the procedure we perform adopts maximum likelihood estimation. In Table 10 and 11 we report results respectively for treatment and outcome, for both alternative measures of downstreamness, with and without hosting country …xed e¤ects.
Preliminarly, we observe that the choice of controlling for endogenous formation of supply chains, conditional on already established a¢liates is successful, as the estimated correlation (rho) in Table  11 , between the errors of the treatment equation and the errors of the outcome equation is statistically signi…cant and high in magnitude, relatively higher when we use the DownMeasure metrics. The Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of the independence of the outcome from the treatment equations.
In any case, the main theoretical prediction of the framework set by Antràs and Chor (2013) is still con…rmed, as in the outcome of Table 10 the interaction term between parent downstreamness and its demand elasticity is positive and statistically signi…cant. The higher the demand elasticity faced by a parent, the more downstream are its integrated suppliers, when its relative positioning is taken into account. Only in the third speci…cation, its coe¢cient and the coe¢cient on the complements' dummy variable are not signi…cant, albeit they align to previous estimates when controlling for country …xed e¤ects in the last column of Table 10 .
Interestingly, even after controlling for simultaneity bias, we con…rm that more productive and bigger parents are able to reach more downstream production stages, proximate to the …nal consumer.
Rather, as expected, some parent characteristics are now not signi…cantly correlated with a¢liate positioning on the chain. Something that we already anticipated in the previous section, as there was a suspect of endogeneity. Especially in the case of parent age and size of its production network, an endogeneous mechanism is particularly evident. An older group had time to become bigger, collecting more a¢liates as a consequence of past choices of vertical integration. Eventually, in Table 10 , we …nd that the average downstreamness is higher for newly integrated a¢liates, as the coe¢cient on the treatment dummy for new and old investment operations is positive and signi…cant. Brie ‡y, there is a substantial di¤erence, previously undetected, between the stock of the a¢liates and the new investment decisions, as regards their actual positioning on the supply chain, which we cannot fully account for with more recent variables. Nonetheless, we can exploit some further information from Table 11 , with respect to parent-level characteristics and their investment decisions over the period of analysis. Bigger and more productive parents integrated less likely new stages of production in our period of analysis, conditional on the stock of a¢liates whose production stages they are already able to control.
Similarly, groups of …rms already collecting a higher number of a¢liates chose less likely further vertical integration. In other words, already big production networks show a lower propensity to add further stages of production to their already complex supply chains, probably after discounting higher internal coordination costs than smaller supply chains developed by parents collecting less a¢liates. In this section we want to explore possible non-linearities along the supply chain, after unbunding parent demand elasticity over a¢liates' downstreamness and controlling for parents' positioning, in this way abandoning the elasticity cuto¤ that Antràs and Chor (2013) identify for identi…cation of sequential complements and substitutes inputs. Therefore adopting a quantile regression on the baseline eq. 1, we …nd that on the conditional median reported in Table 12 the main theoretical prediction is con…rmed, but only when we make use of one of the alternative downstreamness metrics that we have at disposal, DuseTuse, whereas the adoption of the DownMeasure leads to opposite results. As we already noted in Figures 1 and 2, these two measures reported a di¤erent statistical support and skewness in both a¢liates' and parents' distribution. The DownMeasure has a narrower standard deviation and is more skewed to the left. This di¤erence in statistical distribution comes after introducing a weighing system, from input-output tables, in order to correct for the di¤erences in length of productive chains, as originally made by Antràs and Chor (2013) .
To verify that our results are not due to a di¤erent quality of one metric over another, we go beyond conditional median regression and look at single quantiles. Hence, a visualization of marginal e¤ects by quantile helps us in detecting where possible non-linearities arise for both metrics. We report estimates in Figure 3 (Azevedo, 2011) . Note that for parsimony we only draw visual estimates for coe¢cients on parent downstreamness, its elasticity and their interaction term, ceteris paribus the other control variables. Hence, we plot in each panel included the estimates along the vertical axis and the quantiles of a¢liates' downstreamness along the horizontal axis. A reference line is also reported for comparison with simple OLS. Narrow bands of 95% pointwise con…dence intervals are reported for both quantile and OLS speci…cations.
We …nd that all three terms of the regression equation can register non-linearities over a¢liates' downstreamness, whatever metric we adopt, in some cases even crossing the zeros, hence showing a sign reversal. The latter was concealed by OLS estimates, as it averaged out over the a¢liates' distribution. We can also compute the threshold at which our correlations of interest reverse signs, considering the …rst derivative of elasticity on a¢liate downstreamness. Taking into account the combined marginal e¤ect of the elasticity alone and in its interaction with downstreamness, while considering the level of parent downstreamness at that quantile, we estimate a value next to :8. That is, we have a con…rmation of the main theoretical prediction when a¢liates have a value of downstreamness below :8, which is valid for about 70 percent of our a¢liate-level sample. Above that threshold, however, when a¢liates are actually located towards the bottom of the supply chain, the elasticity correlations can become non-signi…cant or can switch signs, depending on the metrics of downstreamness we adopt.
We cannot exclude that a measurement problem can be responsible for the latter …nding, after using industry-level proxies for both positioning on the supply chain and sensitivity to prices by buyers of the …nal product. Still, we can think of some economic rationales that can explain the peculiarity of companies located at the very bottom of a supply chain. Most probably, next to …nal consumers we have horizontal rather than vertical integration, that the theoretical model by Antràs and Chor (2013) is not able to catch. Alternatively, a¢liates at the bottom of the chain can be involved in completely di¤erent lines of business, re ‡ecting a conglomerate nature of the business group to which 
Conclusion
In this contribution we test at the …rm-level the optimal allocation of ownership rights along Global Value Chains. We …nd empirical evidence for the theoretical framework set by Antràs and Chor (2013) , whose main prediction is that vertical integration choices over a sequence of production stages depend both on the relative position of each intermediate producer, and on the surplus that can be extracted from the sale of the …nal output, on which all the producers along the chain can rely. Indeed, we …nd that if the …nal demand elasticity is su¢ciently high, parent companies prefer to engage in vertical integration of downstream production stages. Further, we …nd that parent companies and a¢liates tend to be located in proximity over a supply chains, while we detect some non-linearities towards the bottom, after the VIII decile of a¢liates' downstreamness distribution. We presume that at the end of the supply chain, before reaching the …nal consumer, we are detecting horizontal rather than vertical integration strategies, for which determinants of optimal allocation of property rights can be di¤erent.
We believe that considering the sequentiality in production stages gets to the heart of modern organization of production worldwide, when contracts are incomplete and an unbundling of production tasks is underway, as shared by networks of …rms across national borders.
Hence, we are able also to test for some heterogeneity at the …rm-level over the value chains, as we …nd that more productive and bigger …rms prefer to pick downstream a¢liates. On the other hand, when controlling for present and past choices of integration, we …nd that parent companies controlling bigger and more complex supply chains can su¤er from some increasing coordination costs, for which they show a lower propensity to integrate at the margin.
Investment: computed at parent-level from the Orbis database. It is a dummy variable equal to 1 if parent …rm j has integrated an a¢liate from 2004 to 2012 and 0 otherwise. Contractibility: we source from Antràs and Chor (2013) , who computed from the 2002 U.S. I-O Tables, following the methodology of Nunn (2007) For each IO2002 industry, they …rst calculate the fraction of HS10 constituent codes classi…ed by Rauch (1999) as neither reference-priced nor traded on an organized exchange, under Rauch's "liberal" classi…cation. The original Rauch classi…cation is at the level of SITC Rev. 2 products. These were associated with HS10 codes using a mapping derived from U.S. imports in Feenstra et al. (2002) . The authors took one minus this value as a measure of the own contractibility of each IO2002 industry. This measure we average over the 6-digit NAICS 2007 a¢liate i primary activities.
Entry costs: we source country entry costs from the World Bank -Doing Business. They built it using data on the number of procedures, number of days, and cost (as a percentage of income per capita) required to start a business. We average over [2003] [2004] [2005] for each a¢liate i and host country c.
Rule of law: from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2011) . The annual index is linearly rescaled from its original range [ 2:5; 2:5], in order to lie in a range [0; 1], and averaged over the period 2004-2010 for each a¢liate's country of origin. This re ‡ects perceptions on the extent to which agents have con…dence in and abide by the rules of society, especially in the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the role of police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
